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Abstract 
The network systems of the world are fragile, and can come under attack from any source. The attack can be a denial-of-service 
(DoS) state or another type of threat. What keep the networks safe are the intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS). 
They constantly monitor network traffic and if a malicious threat is detected, the threat is blocked and reported for further 
analysis. However, every defensive system must always have some type of weakness. False negatives and false positives are 
some examples of how IDPS can fail to protect the network. In another instance, a skilled attacker may employ Direct Kernel 
Object Modification (DKOM) to trick the IDPS into detecting no malicious activities. The IDPS is strong, yet not strong enough.
This paper presents a hybrid solution that incorporates both signature and anomaly based systems to detect and prevent more 
malicious attacks by intensifying what is cataloged to include common anomalies to the baselines used by the signature based 
systems. We also propose an improvement in the framework to current Host IDPS/Network using signature and anomaly based 
methodologies by implementing a hybrid VMM-based Honeypot into a theorized self-healing hybrid IDPS to further boost their 
advantages in efficiency and accuracy. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) are essentially a security measure to protect networks from 
both external and internal attacks. An external threat consisting of a skilled hacker may be thwarted by the IDPS. On 
the other hand, an employee for a business with administrator powers may be blocked from bypassing the IDPS and 
reveal all trade secrets. An IDPS inspects all inbound/outbound network activity and takes note of any suspicious 
patterns. These patterns can signify an attack from a person or other system attempting to break into or compromise 
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the administrator’s network. Intrusion, in the context of technology, is the act of attempting to access 
information/data without proper authorization [3]. As a result, intrusions violate the data confidentiality and integrity 
aspects of security. The IDPS was initially developed in the early 90s for generating network attack reports. 
Organizations realized the IDPS potential in cyber security and started their implementation for detecting and 
preventing attacks. All IDPS systems regardless of the variant perform these same functions: to record data related 
to observed events, to notify the security administrator(s) of the important observed events, and to produce reports 
for the administrator(s). 
The IDPS protects network systems using methods that include anomaly-based detection, stateful protocol 
analysis, and signature-based detection [1]. In addition to these methods, organizations have found other uses for 
IDPS: identifying security policy problems, documenting an existing threat to an organization, and deferring 
individuals from violating security policies. In some cases, these techniques can be merged and formed into a hybrid 
IDPS. In order to successfully implement the security measures, the architecture must be considered. The 
architecture is comprised of four vital components: event generators, event analysers, response units, and event 
databases [2]. These components can be connected to each other through an organization’s network known as a 
management network. If used, each sensor or agent host has an additional network interface known as a 
management interface that connects to the management network. The management servers, database servers, and 
consoles are attached to the management network only. This architecture effectively isolates the management 
network from the production networks.  
The benefits of this architecture includes concealing the existence and identity of the IDPS from attackers; 
protecting the IDPS from attack; and ensuring that the IDPS has adequate bandwidth to function under adverse 
conditions. Disadvantages of using a management network include the additional costs in networking equipment and 
other hardware and the costly deployment of multiple computer workspaces [4].  
2. Security challenges and errors for IDPS 
A common error of the IDPS is improper threat detection. Fake threats or non-malicious intrusions are termed 
False Positives (FP for short). An example of this is one everybody experiences: junk or spam mail. An endearing e-
mail message from a loved one or business partner can easily be mistaken as a threat and sent to the junk mail 
folder; thus a False Positive. Another prevalent error alongside FPs are False Negatives (FN for short). FNs are 
threat alerts that were in place but did not trigger. In the common Anomaly-based detection method used in IDPS, 
one of its techniques called data-mining is heavily criticized for its high FP and FN error. The technique places a 
high overhead, where the complex computing essentially has difficulty correctly identifying events occurring to the 
network system [1]. From [5], we are given an alarming statistical report: 
x There are 13 times more FPs than there are FNs although the number of attack types in FP and FN are similar
x About 91 percent of FP alerts are not related to security issues
x Buffer overflow, SQL server attacks and worm slammer attacks account for 93 percent of FNs
There are three common methodologies an IDPS may use: Stateful Protocol Analysis, Signature-based detection, 
and Anomaly-based detection. Signature-based detection is optimized for known threats, but attackers can always 
devise new malicious ways to bypass this method [1]. This method does not have a high rate of FP or FN as much as 
the Anomaly-based detection method. Stateful protocol analysis looks at the system as a whole, comparing the 
normal protocol behavior with any unusual events occurring in the system [1]. Out of the three methodologies, 
anomaly-based detection is the most error-prone and overbearing on the computer system. Hybrid IDPS is the cream 
of the crop, with the lowest rate of FNs and FPs. However, it is still understandable that the Anomaly-based 
detection system can be improved to have a lesser rate of FPs and FNs. Moreover, its ease of use can be simplified 
in a manner that makes it resource efficient and user friendly [1]. 
3. Analysis of existing IDPS and Honeypot systems 
Several ideas currently being explored in the IT world have served to bring about our proposed framework. In 
[6], they devised a hybrid structure that combines both Host-based IDPS and Network-based IDS. The placement of 
certain elements in the structure defines this unique theorized hybrid IDS. By accurate and strategic deployment of 
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the IDS elements, it ensures “timely counter-measures against intrusions”, proving the enhanced efficiency their 
proposed structure would hold over other current IDPSs [6]. Their system utilizes a variety of detection engines 
based on “Snort, Bayesian Classifier, Decision tree and Naive Bayes techniques”. The system boasts two IDPS 
classes that purport to be “self-healing”, meaning every intrusion detected and logged by the detection engines will 
be relayed to the central IDPOC unit, where it will update the knowledge base alert the user of the intrusion.
With our virtualization idea applied to an IDPS and Honeypot, we hope to mitigate the damage inflicted by 
intrusions and prevent stealth activity as much as possible. Take for example the method implemented by [10], 
which utilizes an IDS such as SNORT inserted into a switch located in a hypervisor along with their own Honeypot. 
Their SNORT would be installed on a VMware such as VMware virtual ESX machine. The ESX is primarily a 
cloud security measure, but the idea can easily be transported over to the PC itself, resulting in network integrity 
protection. Their solution would also support virtualization to help reduce cost and the overall physical resource 
burden on the network. The idea promotes “unprecedented flexibility, efficiency, and support for the huge 
workloads a user encounters”. It is important to note the similarity of this proposition with ours. However, our 
solution incorporates a hybrid IDPS and a hybrid Honeypot, where the Honeypot is utilized in the virtual layer rather 
than the IDPS. They do mention that while the idea would be perfect for protecting a cloud server, the virtualization 
technique protecting a huge network of cloud servers would definitely require a huge amount of computing power.
Another method that is closely related to ours can be found in [8], where the use of a HoneyPharm is 
implemented. Their “pharm” consists of a Clustered Honeypot where each cluster consists of at least one Honeynet 
and encompasses two or more low interaction Honeypots [8]. Similar to our hybrid Honeypot system, the low 
interaction Honeypot detects attackers and traps the activities of the attacker by limiting the amount of attacker 
interaction while the high interaction Honeypot analyses the activities filtered by the low interaction Honeypot and 
stores it in log files as a way to process the packets sent by attackers. With their algorithm, it is expected that they 
are able to achieve a number of goals in 4 steps [8]. In the 4th step, the population of high interaction Honeypot 
needs to be kept low due to the limited portion of traffic being routed to them. High interaction Honeypots are kept 
under strict monitoring. If one gets infected, it will be detected and recovered. Another section of the 4th step states 
that information of the attacker and their techniques will be immediately relayed to the user. This allows users to 
keep track of similar attackers and common techniques to better prepare themselves against future attacks. The 
information is sent to a centralized repository that analyzes the logs to better understand the techniques used for 
attacking. Lastly, low interaction honeypots emulate different machines running in the network so that mapping 
several machines on the same operating system is achievable. The only fault with this research, however, is that they 
did not give any simulation results of using the approach. If simulation results were provided, the success of this 
research would be clarified. 
4. Proposed Hybrid IDPS and Honeypot model 
Current hybrids implement either a host-based intrusion detection prevention system or a network-based 
intrusion detection prevention system. These HIDPS or NIDPS respectively are coupled with one or more 
methodologies such as anomaly or signature based detection. Currently, both host and network IDPS used both the 
Bayesian Networks and the Hidden Markov Model together to sniff the data packets that are detected. In [6], a 
proposed new architecture designed to be more responsive and fast was presented, merging both NIDPS with 
HIDPS, connected through a centralized control center, the (IDPOC). The multi-threads segment is for massive data 
traffic flow, where it sifts through the large burst of data packets. The multi-threads effectively sort out the fast and 
large packets from the small and slow packets. An audit data collection module will be implemented alongside the 
multi-threads. The framework in [6] is already more than effective against any known and unknown malicious 
threats, yet one problem still remains called resource overhead. The burden of such a complicated hybrid system is 
high upon the host PC. We simplified the model to keep the IDPS efficient yet relieve most of the burden off the 
host hardware. The first element of our rectified model will be the NIDPS, as shown in Fig 1, followed by the 
HIDPS segment that is depicted in Fig 2. Each sector will conclude data analysis by sending feedback to the IDPOC, 
as shown in Fig. 3. 
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Figure 1: First segment of the main Hybrid IDPS model                                    Figure 2: Second segment of the main Hybrid IDPS model 
Using this theorized hybrid structure as a baseline for our proposed 
solution; we will place a hybrid high interaction and low interaction 
Honeypot just before the firewall, in the space commonly referred to as the 
“Demilitarized Zone” or DMZ [8]. It is important to note that we will 
implement each Honeypot in this system within a Virtual Machine. For 
example, the low interaction Honeypot will be one VM while the high 
interaction Honeypot will be another VM. The Honeypot will be utilizing 
the computational model Genetic Algorithm and the soft-computational 
method Fuzzy Logic to essentially analyze all incoming data traffic [7]. 
The Genetic Algorithm at the same time will create a set of rules for the 
Intrusion Prevention Rule set, focused for the signature-based segment of 
the Honeypot system [7]. For the anomaly-based segment, Fuzzy Logic 
works by analyzing each packet with its “degrees of truths” [9]. Fuzzy 
logic, unlike other models, does not solely observe the 1 and the 0, or the 
“true” and the “false”. Fuzzy logic assigns 1 and 0 as absolute truth and 
absolute false, then looks at data in between the absolutes [9]. This is 
perfect for anomaly related methods because suspicious behavior in the 
real world does not always display absolute false or absolute truth 
behavior. Our proposed Honeypot hybrid system will consist of High interaction and Low interaction segments, 
utilized via a hypervisor for low overhead consumption as well as practicality as shown by Fig. 4. 
4.1. Theorized improved framework process 
Incoming internet traffic will flow from the router through the Firewall, which acts as a basic filter between the 
trusted internal network and the untrusted outside network.  If an intrusion is detected it will be immediately blocked 
at this point. Like Intrusion Prevention Systems, Firewalls exist to primarily block outside threats based on its 
specific rule set. Its rule set can be extremely strict or not, depending on the user. For this system, focusing on 
minimizing resource consumption as well as staying relevant to the “detection and prevention” theme is extremely 
important. With this in mind, the Firewall will be at the bare minimal, creating a rule set where the incoming traffic 
will be analyzed via SPI or Stateful Packet Inspection [11]. SPI works by “deep analyzing” data traffic from an 
external source, which determines what packet goes through and what does not. SPI also prioritizes analyzing the 
TCP and UDP header details, as well as logging the port numbers, source and destination address, and other relevant 
information each session [12]. Each data packet that comes through will be blocked, heavily analyzed, and logged, 
keeping the Firewall rule set basic to make up for the resource consumption by the main IDPS system.  
Figure 3: Third segment of the IDPS model
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Figure 4: Hybrid VM-Based Honeypot accompanying the Hybrid IDPS 
The Firewall’s logged sessions serve to compare data with the IDPOC’s Reference Module. An SPI Firewall 
should be the first line of defence, and should serve as an essential partner to the Hybrid Honeypot IDPS system. 
After the Firewall, the traffic will continue on to the VM Hybrid Honeypot. The VM Hybrid Honeypot can direct 
traffic toward two routes, either through the Low Interaction Honeypot or the High Interaction Honeypot. Each of 
the Honeypot will refer to the Reference Module located in the IDPOC [7]. Before data goes to either of the 
Honeypots, the data will be compared to the Reference Module’s information. The system will not understand the 
nature of the attack unless the incoming data traffic is cross-referenced with all data held in the Reference Module. 
For example, if an attacker used a DDoS method of attack through the network and the IDPS successfully prevented 
the intrusion, the attack will have been analyzed and stored for future prevention of the same attack. Likewise, 
anytime the system’s security profile changes or updates, the behavior profiles will be logged and used to cross-
reference future attacks. 
The signature database located in the NIDPS segment underneath the VM-Hybrid Honeypot will be preloaded 
with common forms of attack signatures currently used today. If an attack is already known based on existing data 
held in our IDPS’s Reference Module for the signature database, then the traffic will go toward the High Honeypot 
section. If an attack is unknown, then the traffic will be redirected towards the Low Honeypot section. Traffic taken 
through the Low Honeypot section will be analyzed via a Genetic Algorithm based on Figure 3 as described by Soni 
et al. [7] which works as follows: 
1. Generate the initial population of data files based on unknown attack,  
2. Evaluate objective function and set the minimum criteria for it to pass, 
3. Decides if optimization criteria are met,  
4. If No, then the population goes through a selection, recombination, and mutation process and cycles back to 
step 2.
5. If the optimization criteria are finally met, then the system has successfully analyzed the enemy unknown 
attack. If an attack is previously known due to signature traces logged in the Reference Module, then traffic 
will be relayed towards the High Honeypot section.  
For our proposed model, the general genetic algorithm would be underperforming, since each segment must 
specialize in either anomaly or signature based methods only, never both. Adaptive genetic algorithms would work 
better due to “superior performance and its effective optimization method” [13]. The team’s IAGA, Interval 
Adaptive Genetic Algorithm, has a similar process to the generic genetic algorithm, but in this case each “evolved” 
packet sample is moved to the next interval with higher requirements, eventually leading to “elite” samples that can 
help the system withstand an attack from the same source effectively than before [13]. Adaptive genetic algorithms 
can broaden its “search” range in analyzing which data packets will become successful in overcoming an incoming 
attack. For our system, we will adopt a genetic algorithm that is similar to the IAGA that will fit the needs of our 
architecture.
374   Syed Rizvi et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  95 ( 2016 )  369 – 374 
5. Conclusion and future directions 
In conclusion, by taking two innovative ideas in the IDPS field and constructing our own improved models, the 
hybrid genre of IDPS will be expanded. The never before proposed idea of combining an NIDPS with a HIDPS 
commanded by a central core is already efficient and reliable. Multi-threads split data traffic into manageable sizes 
to improve efficiency and reduce resource consumption. Utilizing signature detection methods solely for the NIDPS 
and the anomaly detection methods for HIDPS respectively reduces resource consumption rather than implementing 
both modules for each sector. Adding only the relevant audit data collection modules keeps the system organized 
while being simplistic in architectural nature. The IDPOC introduced in the hybrid model provides the user with the 
options to quarantine threats or ban data traffic from specific sources, based on the feedback received from the 
NIDPS and HIDPS segments. We implemented the hybrid VM-based Honeypot system alongside the hybrid IDPS 
which makes up for the reduction in efficiency by specializing NIDPS in signature based methods and HIDPS in 
anomaly based methods, while maintaining the objective of decreasing resource consumption. We plan on 
implementing the theorized architecture in future research. In order to further research, algorithms similar to the 
standard genetic and fuzzy logic methods must be created, including neural techniques. 
References 
1. D. Mudzingwa and R. Agrawal, “A study of Methodologies used in Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (Intrusion Detection 
Prevention System),” in Southeastcon, 2012 Proceedings of IEEE, 2012 © IEEE. doi:10.1109/SECon.2012.6197080. 
2. I. Corona, G. Giacinto, and F. Roli, “Adversarial attacks against intrusion detection systems: Taxonomy, solutions and open issues,” 
Information Sciences, vol. 239, pp. 201–225, 2013. -- http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/science/article/pii/
S002002551 3002119.  
3. B. Beigh, U. Bashir, M.Chachoo “Intrusion Detection and Prevention System: Issues and Challenges”, International Journal of Computer 
Applications (0975 – 8887) Volume 76– No.17, August 2013.  
4. K. Scarfone, and P. Mell, 'Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems', 2015. [Online] http://ecinetworks.com/wp-
content/uploads/bsk-files-manager/86_SP800-94.pdf   
5. A. B. Pawar, D. N. Kyatanavar, and M. A. Jawale, “Advanced Intrusion Detection System with Prevention Capabilities,” International 
Journal of Computer Applications, vol. 106, no. 13, pp. 17–24, 2014.  
6. F. Idrees, M. Rajarajan, A. Memon, "Framework for distributed and self-healing hybrid intrusion detection and prevention system," in ICT 
Convergence (ICTC), 2013 International Conference on , vol., no., pp.277-282, 14-16 Oct. 2013 doi: 10.1109/ICTC.2013.6675357.  
7. D. Soni and A. Chugh, “GHIDS: A HYBRID HONEYPOT SYSTEM USING GENETIC ALGORITHM,” Computer Technology & 
Applications, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 187–191, 2012.  
8. P. Rawat, S. Goel, M. Agarwal, R. Singh. “Securing WMN Using Hybrid Honeypot System”, International Journal of Distributed and 
Parallel Systems (IJDPS) Vol.3, No.3, May 2012.  
9. P. Hajek, “Fuzzy Logic,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010. [Online]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-
fuzzy.  
10. A. Bakshi and B. Yogesh, "Securing Cloud from DDOS Attacks Using Intrusion Detection System in Virtual Machine," in Communication 
Software and Networks, 2010. ICCSN '10. Second International Conference on, vol., no., pp.260-264, 26-28 Feb. 2010.  
11. M. Desmond, “What You Should Know About Firewalls,” What You Should Know About Firewalls. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/117557/article.html.  
12. M. L. Colleague, “Packet filtering and Stateful Firewall | MitigationLog,”MitigationLog, 2014. [Online]. Available at: 
http://mitigationlog.com/packet-filtering-stateful-firewall.  
13. F. Wang, H. Zhu and J. Wang. The interval adaptive genetic algorithm. International Journal of Advancements in Computing Technology 
4(22), pp. 48-55. 2012. Available: http://search.proquest.com/docview/1326733834?accountid=13158. 
